Derek Parfit, On What Matters, Volume 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
Derek Parfit, On What Matters, Volume 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
Philip Kitcher, "The Lure of the Peak," in The New Republic, February 2, 2012, at p. 30.
Larissa MacFarquhar, "How to be Good," in The New Yorker, September 5, 2011, at p. 43. (Shameful.)
Juan Galis-Menendez, "The Mind/Body Problem and Freedom," http://www.criticalvision.blogspot.com/2007/02/mindbody-and-freedom.html
Juan Galis-Menendez, "How to be Good," in http://www.againstdarkarts.blogspot.com/
Philip Kitcher's review of Derek Parfit's massive two-volume examination of ethical theory is marred by a final section which could not have been written by the ostensible author of this article.
I suspect that a person (or persons) writing as "LARISSA MACFARQUHAR" is responsible for a concluding section of this review which undermines the preceding argument to the extent that the article-review contains any effective argument against or in opposition to Parfit's book.
I focus on a few difficulties in the reviewer's response to Professor Parfit's work: 1) the relation between religion and ethics; 2) the anthropological confusions and claims in some remarkable parts of this essay; 3) the worse confusions concerning "naturalism" and problems with Parfit's purported reconciliation of Kantian deontological theory with his Sidgwick-based teleological commitments. Parfit's curious form of consequentialism dates at least from Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).
These commitments and Parfit's elaborations of them make his theory reminiscent of rule-utilitarianism in the style of Richard Brandt. The significance of Parfit's "fusion approach" and suggested resolution of the time-honored conflict between the "right and the good" is ignored by TNR's reviewer.
Derek Parfit's goal in his more recent work is to dissolve the tension between the right and the good that has plagued philosophy since Kant. The jury is still out on whether Parfit has succeeded in this effort. Unfortunately, this reviewer will not be very helpful for readers seeking to come to terms with Parfit's efforts or importance.
1. Ethics and Religion.
"From Plato on, most philosophers have denied that the will of a deity could have anything to do with what is required of us." (p. 30.)
This is a bizarre statement for a professor of philosophy to make. What about Jesus or Muhammad, St. Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Maimonedes, Bishop Berkeley, Kierkegaard, Simone Weil, Gabriel Marcel and so many others in the Western tradition alone who see ALL human knowledge as "participation in God's divine essence"?
No answer to this question is provided by Professor Kitcher. Most philosophers, including those within secular traditions (Karl Marx), have traced the origins of moral awareness to vital religious traditions and spiritual values -- even as those traditions and values are criticized -- recognizing or celebrating a unique importance and value to human lives.
Persons are necessarily moral subjects worthy of respect as well as attention in all religious traditions. The relation between religion and ethics, in other words, may be much more subtle than a matter of "commands" issued by a deity. ("Is it rational to believe in God?" and "Jacques Derrida's Philosophy as Jazz.")
Among the strange and unsupported historical generalizations by Professor Kitcher is the claim that " ... for at least a century philosophers have known that this kind of [ethical] knowledge is mistaken." (p. 34.)
For at least a century, in fact, many philosophers -- like Brand Blanshard, Paul Weiss, or John Rawls, who is mistakenly mentioned as a "naturalist" in ethics, have agreed with Professor Parfit on this issue. (p. 35.)
Ralws is actually a Kantian deontologist -- and, unlike Professor Parfit, an opponent of utilitarianism -- whose a priori foundations in ethics and contractarianism in politics are nonetheless deemed helpful by Parfit in his fusion theory. ("John Rawls and Justice" and "Roberto Unger's Revolutionary Legal Theory.")
Rawls and Robert Nozick also agree with Parfit, as ethical cognitivists and objectivists, that there is indeed ethical truth and that moral philosophy yields "objective knowledge" of the human world of meanings that is distinct from scientific knowledge of empirical facts. ("Bernard Williams and Identity" and "Immanuel Kant and the Narrative of Freedom" then "John Searle and David Chalmers on Consciousness.")
Facts must be judged or INTERPRETED in terms of values. Accordingly, evaluation is concerned with applying values to fictional or actual cases where they can be tested. ("John Finnis and Ethical Cognitivism" and "Why I am not an ethical relativist.")
Albert Einstein (magic elevator, train moving at the speed of light), Steven Hawking (falling into a black hole), Brian Greene (string theory on video) -- all have made use of thought experiments in physics. Judith Jarvis Thomson and Martha Nussbaum, John Rawls and Robert Nozick have used fictional cases extensively in their philosophical writings. Derek Parfit is in good company. ("The 'Galatea Scenario' and the Mind/Body Problem.")
2. Anthropology.
Another weird statement in this review concerns the origins of ethical life that were, allegedly, based on "fifty thousand years" of social experimentation with ethical rules through "discussion and debate" -- an assertion that is unsupported by any footnote. (p. 35.)
Writing and civilization as well as sophisticated abstract thought made possible by language are regarded as about 5,000 years-old. Arnold Toynbee or the historian of your choice should make this issue clear for you. Hence, this statement about 50,000 years of social experiments with ethical ideals is not only factually wrong, but absurd.
The real difficulties for Parfit's position, which the author of section 4 of this essay-review is not competent to discuss, concerns the scope of "naturalism" -- which is poorly defined and understood by the reviewer -- and how the understanding of "naturalism" as distinct from "scientism" relates to Parfit's effort to transcend the debate favored by Kantians (while remaining a Kantian) centering ethical life on the "right action" over the "good result." ("Out of the Past" and "F.H. Bradley's Absolute.")
Parfit offers a priori foundations for what is essentially a non-naturalistic form of teleology that is respectful of science, making use of right action to effectuate optimal outcomes or good results. Useful comparisons to the works of R.M. Hare and P.F. Strawson are obvious.
Does Parfit resolve the tensions between the ideas brought together in his theory?
I suggest that students may wish to compare the works of T.M. Scanlon and Bernard Williams as adversaries and partners in discussion with Professor Parfit on this question.
The TNR reviewer, apparently, does not know and/or can not say how Parfit meets his challenge of reconciliation, that is, if he/she has actually read Parfit's book.
I doubt that at least one of the persons writing this review has read -- or is capable of reading -- Parfit's work.
3. "Naturalism"
As for "naturalism," you either accept limitation in thought to natural facts (a limitation which is not itself a "natural fact") or you go beyond such facts to formulate principles or values allowing for the resolution through judgment of ethical controversies.
You either accept the fact/value distinction or you reject or limit that distinction to permit objective ethical knowledge and understandings to emerge.
Even philosophers who accept the fact/value distinction may defend the objectivity of ethical judgments.
This reviewer begins by accepting the fact/value distinction and ends by abandoning it, perhaps unknowingly leaving it behind thereby proving Parfit's point. The reviewer accepts an undefined "naturalism," allegedly, while admitting nevertheless that:
"The changes come about not through recognition of some special ethical fact, hitherto unappreciated, but through the discovery of natural facts, about people, their capacities, sufferings, and aspirations, on the basis of which there are new probabilities for mutual engagement." (emphasis added, p. 35.)
Ethical theories and values are "built on" natural facts while not themselves being natural facts. Evaluation is concerned with the interpretation of natural facts that provide the scientific basis for conclusions of value, decisions about right and wrong, good and evil. This is the opposite of a defense of "naturalism" and the "fact/value distinction," these concepts do not designate the same thing or have the same meaning. ("Nihilists in Disneyworld" and "Nihilism Against Memory.")
It follows from the reviewer's own language that no natural fact can establish ethical conclusions (fact/value) even if they are, somehow, ESSENTIAL to such conclusions.
This concession by the reviewer undermines the fact/value distinction, again, or "Hume's Guillotine." On the assumption that you wish to hang on to the fact/value distinction this reviewer's statement makes no sense. ("Hilary Putnam is Keeping it Real.")
This is the dilemma that Parfit wishes to resolve. This novel position ("let's get beyond the fact/value distinction") is shared with Roberto Unger and found in pre-modern philosophy (no fact/value problem) from Aristotle and Aquinas to John Finnis and virtue ethics today.
Parfit wishes to resolve the opposition between teleology and deontology. Please see H.L.A. Hart's classic essay "Between Utility and Rights."
The fact/value problem only enters Western philosophy with David Hume. I refer readers to Alasdair McIntyre's important book, After Virtue. A number of philosophers have attempted to square this circle, that is, to overcome the fact/value problem, notably Catholic philosophers and Hilary Putnam, also Iris Murdoch. This review is self-contradictory and, occasionally, ridiculous. I cannot believe that it was written by Philip Kitcher.
The realization that the reviewer of Professor Parfit's seminal scholarly work (whoever that person or persons may be) is unaware of what the book is about is shocking and sad.
Readers of TNR deserve better than this article, as does Derek Parfit.
