Larissa MacFarquhar, "How to be Good," in The New Yorker, September 5, 2011, at p. 43.
Please compare Larissa MacFarquhar, "Two Heads: A Marriage Devoted to the Mind/Body Problem," in The New Yorker, February 12, 2007, at p. 58 with Juan Galis-Menendez, "The Mind/Body Problem and Freedom," http://www.criticalvision.blogspot.com/2007/02/mindbody-problem-and-freedom.html
I am embarassed for The New Yorker magazine and offended on behalf of Derek Parfit. I have never seen such a poorly written essay published in U.S. media, let alone in this hallowed magazine. A typical sentence by Ms. MacFarquhar reads: "But, assuming that we could be convinced, how should we think about it." (p. 44.) How indeed. There are worse sentences on the same page and throughout the article: "That seems quite different -- but the death of any person could hardly make a difference to the identity of another." (p. 44.)
I invite the reader to ponder the image of Mrs. Kennedy at her husband's -- President Kennedy's -- funeral, then to read the quoted statement again. The true author of this article (Manohla Dargis? David Remnick?) mistakes or fails entirely to understand or even appreciate Professor Parfit's philosophical theory. It is inaccurate or incomplete, at best, to suggest that, according to Parfit, "Personal identity is not what matters." (p. 43.)
Professor Parfit has argued, eloquently and suggestively, that survival may not be what matters to what we call "personal identity." This is not quite the same thing. Parfit's "closest continuer theory" is not mentioned by this author even though this concept is fundamental to Parfit's understanding of personal identity as well as to his ethics.
I fear that at least one person responsible for this article does not speak, read, or write the English language with ease -- or at all. I do not believe that the author of this article has read Professor Parfit's books. Worse, it may be that this author has not read any book. I hope never to see another article like this one in The New Yorker.
Philosophy is a difficult and highly technical subject. The thoughts of a respected metaphysician are not "data" to be absorbed in one hour before writing an essay. The writings of philosophers -- such as Derek Parfit or Jacques Derrida, Cornel West or John Rawls -- require years of effort and patient, devoted study. I am not an expert on Derek Parfit's works. However, I have been reading Parfit's texts since the eighties. ("Jacques Derrida's Philosophy as Jazz" and "John Searle and David Chalmers on Consciousness.")
I regard much of Parfit's thinking as suggestive and unusually imaginative, even when I believe that he is mistaken about the issues. Parfit is difficult and has never been a philosopher who is easily summarized. I regard Parfit as a utilitarian, much more influenced by Henry Sidgewick and (less so) by John Stuart Mill and Bertrand Russell -- whom he reacts against -- as well as deeply affected by the death of Gareth Evans, which explains his "existentialist" concern with death in Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), where Parfits comments:
"Seventeen years ago I drove to Andalusia with Gareth Evans. I hoped to become a philosopher, and as we drove through France I put to him my fledgling ideas. His merciless criticisms made me despair. Before we reached Spain, hope returned. I saw that he was almost as critical of his own ideas. Like many others, I owe much to the intensity of his love for truth, and his extraordinary vitality. I record this debt first because he died when he was 34." (Acknowledgements.)
Rawls and Nozick, Putnam and Rorty are much less important to Professor Parfit's thinking than many American students of Parfit's writings suppose. I nearly enjoyed the opportunity of studying with Professor Parfit at New York University since he was the university's "star" philosopher -- along with Ronald Dworkin -- when I applied and was admitted to the graduate program in philosophy at NYU. ("John Rawls and Justice" then "Hilary Putnam is Keeping it Real" and "Richard Rorty's Ethical Skepticism.")
For a competent critique of Parfit's works by a scholar who has actually read his books and who refrains from Soap Opera-like psychoanalysis, see: Harold Noonan, "Parfit and What Matters in Personal Identity," in Personal Identities (London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 192-210.
Derek Parfit's self-summary is still the best concise statement of his views: " ... the importance of identity is derivative -- ... what matters in the continued existence of a person are various personal relationships. ..."
Derek Parfit, "Lewis, Perry, and What Matters," in A.O. Rorty, ed., The Identities of Persons (Berkeley: University of California, 1969), p. 101.
Parfit's ethics -- especially with respect to duties owed to future persons and responsibility for harm caused to anonymous others, i.e., by robot bombs -- is vitally important for officials in powerful countries to ponder as they debate the use of military force as an instrument of foreign policy:
"It is not enough to ask, 'Will my act harm other people?' Even if the answer is No, my act may still be wrong, because of its effects on other people. I should ask, 'Will my act be one of a set of acts that will together harm other people? The answer may be Yes. And the harm to others may be great. ["Terry Tuchin, Diana Lisa Riccioli, and New Jersey's Agency of Torture"] If this is so, I may be acting very wrongly, like the Harmless Torturers."
Reasons and Persons, at pp. 80-90.
