February 21, 2013 at 1:35 P.M. Plagiarism of my writings and ideas continues to go unpunished. "Caitland Flanagan" (Larissa MacFarquhar? David Remnick?) is the byline in an article entitled: "Inventing Marilyn Monroe," in The Atlantic Monthly, March, 2013, at p. 92 which is taken from my posted essay: "'My Week With Marilyn': A Movie Review." Please see "What is it like to be plagiarized?" and "'Brideshead Revisited': A Movie Review." ("Albert Florence and New Jersey's Racism.")
How much of what appears in American print media today is stolen from powerless persons (like me), whose intellectual property rights do not concern America's media "darlings" or courts? Is this an example of American journalistic "ethics"? ("New Jersey's 'Ethical' Legal System" and "'Nice Babies' and Bad Psychologists.")
Billions of persons are stolen from in our world, often by the kinds of persons whose prose is published in American media, with some honorable exceptions among journalists. The anger generated by such unpunished thefts is bound to create an intense response. Let us hope that civilized means may be found to resolve these matters. ("How censorship works in America.")
A lecture and film at AMC Magic Johnson Theaters, Harlem 9, March 16, 2013 at 1:00 P.M., 124th and Fredrick Douglass Blvd., Harlem, New York, N.Y. focuses on "Bob Avakian and American Socialism." You do not have to be a socialist to be interested in this topic and thinker, Mr. Avakian. I am not now nor have I ever been a member of the Communist party. http://www.revolutionbooks.org
Jennifer Shuessler, "An Author Attracts Unlikely Allies," in The New York Times, February 7, 2013, at p. C1.
Thomas Nagel, "Naturalism and Religion," in The Last Word (Oxford: Oxford U. Press, 1997), p. 131.
Thomas Nagel, "Freedom," in Gary Watson, ed., Readings in Philosophy: Free Will (Oxford: Oxford U. Press, 2003), pp. 229-256. (2nd Ed.)
Thomas Nagel, "Subjective and Objective," in Mortal Questions (Cambridge U. Press, 1978), pp. 196-215.
Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (New Jersey: Princeton U. Press, 1970), pp. 90-99 ("Objective Reasons").
Mary Midgely, Science and Poetry (New York & London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 79-135.
Thomas Nagel's recent book calling into question the ideological presuppositions of American scientism -- probably without realizing or intending this as an explicit goal in the process of expressing some sensible reservations about Darwinian reductivism -- has generated a great deal of controversy.
Among the more confused reactions is "Jennifer Shuessler's" ("Caitland Flanagan's"?) comment on a book that she clearly has not read. I also have not read this most recent work by Professor Nagel. However, I have read several other texts by this author.
Ms. Shuessler appears to be making two points against Professor Nagel's position: 1). Nagel's book will have little effect on the progress of science and does not discredit Darwinian evolutionary theory; 2). Although Nagel is an "avowed atheist," his recent book has been reviewed, admiringly, by religious scholars in periodicals such as First Things.
This so-called "strange alliance" between the NYU philosopher and a few religious persons, for some reasons (at least in the mind of Ms. Shuessler), discredits Nagel's ideas.
I disagree. No author is responsible for his readers' reactions, provided that he or she has been as clear as possible in expressing controversial opinions. Professor Nagel is a good and clear writer whose texts are not difficult to understand, whether one agrees or disagrees with his arguments.
Nagel certainly has no wish to discredit Darwin. Few people question the reality of evolution. The extent, scope, and nature of evolution of organisms is a matter of continuing discussion and debate among scientists and other scholars -- scholars who also debate the implications of Darwin's theory beyond biology.
Nagel questions Darwinian reductivism, as I say, when it is applied to social phenomena. To dismiss or trivialize active philosophical controversies, on the basis of an extension of Darwin's thinking into the humanities, seems bizarre and unwarranted.
I agree that such questions and reservations about evolution are valid, as do scientists like Richard Lewontin, Steven Jay Gould, and many others.
Darwin would have been astonished to learn that his work is used to criticize theologians and literary critics. Darwinian theory was never intended to tell us what is the best art or philosophy, nor to adjudicate between or among religions.
Ms. Shuessler seems to admit the legitimacy of such limitations of Darwin and even of suggestions that teleological explanations retain some validity in what many believe to be our "meaningless universe."
If our universe truly is meaningless, then why bother to explain anything? Is any explanation possible or necessary if everything is absurd? ("Why I am not an ethical relativist" and "Whatever.")
" ... even the best supported science, empirically speaking, is still emeshed in unsettled metaphysical questions." (Shuessler, p. C1.)
All of life is built on "unsettled metaphysical questions." This may be a further guarantee of human freedom. Professor Nagel's concern is not with science, but precisely with those "unsettled" metaphysical and epistemological questions.
Nagel does not attack science and accepts Darwin's importance in explaining the pattern of human evolution.
Mr. Nagel is simply asking important questions about the kinds of explanations which may be necessary in our efforts to understand a universe (or multiverse) which is more complex and protean than Charles Darwin could have imagined. I refer readers to Robert Nozick's writings on "explanation" and "explanatory schemes."
Nagel's focus is on the possibility of goal-directed (teleological) explanations for discreet phenomena in the unfolding narrative of the "living" universe. This is an entirely secular and naturalistic project which may, incidentally, be helpful to theologians and other secular humanistic scholars pursuing related projects. There should be no guilt by association in academia.
Nagel's epistemological premises are entirely consistent with the findings of scientists, biologists and physicists among them. The controversy about this book, properly, concerns only the possible interpretations of data and theories. ("Is it rational to believe in God?")
Ms. Shuessler deploys terms and concepts like "empirical" and "metaphysical" without a very clear idea of their possible meanings, also without offering a single definition of her terms. With all due respect, this person -- under whatever name they/he/she/it chooses to write -- is simply confused in dealing with these matters:
" ... ludicrous overuse of evolutionary theory," Nagel says, is made "to explain everything about the human mind. Darwin enabled modern culture to heave a great sigh of relief, by apparently providing a way to eliminate purpose, meaning, and design as fundamental features of the world. Instead, they become epiphenomena, generated incidentally by a process that can be entirely explained by the operation of the non-teleological laws of physics on the materials of which we and our environments are composed. There might still be thought to be a religious threat in the laws of physics themselves, [bingo] and indeed in the existence of anything at all [bingo, again!] -- but it seems to be less alarming to most atheists." (The Last Word, p. 131.)
